


# Theory

## Problem Setup

Y Outcome                      Z Instrument                      U Common Confounder  
 A Treatment/Action              W Negative Control Outcome               $\tilde{U}$  Non-Common Confounder

### A-ICC Simple Common Confounding Model

1. Consistency:  $Y=Y(A, Z)$  and  $W=W(A, Z)$
2. **Conditional instrument exogeneity:**  $(Y, W) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid (A, U)$
3. **Instrument relevance (completeness):** For any  $g(A, U) \in L_2(A, U)$ ,  $E[g(A, U)|Z] = 0$  only when  $g(A, U) = 0$ .
4. **Negative control outcomes:**  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp (A, Z) \mid U$ .  
 There exists some function  $h_0(A, U) \in L_2(A, U)$  such that  $E[h_0(A, W) \mid A, U] = E[Y \mid A, U]$  a.s.



Causal effect of interest:  $J = E \left[ \int_{\mathcal{A}} Y(a) \pi(a) d\mu_A(a) \right]$  (e.g. ATE of A on Y with U conditioned out)

A-LS Linearly Separable Outcome Model:  $Y = k_0(A, U) + \epsilon_Y$  with  $E[\epsilon_Y|Z, U] = 0$ .

# Application: Returns to Education

## Problem Setup

- Common confounders U prevalent in economics: Ability [Griliches, 1977], attitude [Green et al., 1998]
- Treatment result of individuals' choice with heterogeneous returns (endogeneity) [Heckman et al., 2006]
- Endogenous or weak instruments often used [Cunha et al., 2006; Carneiro & Heckman, 2002]

Y Household net worth at 35              Z Pre-college GPA measures              U Ability  
 A BA degree                                  W Health measures at 29                       $\tilde{U}$  Other biases (selection)  
 X Individual/family characteristics (sex, parental education/net worth, etc)  
 Notes: Data from NLS97. n = 3,708.

### A-LL Local Linear Common Confounding Model

1. Model linearity:  $Y = \alpha_Y(X) + A\beta(X) + U\gamma_Y(X) + W\zeta(X) + \epsilon_Y$ ,  $W = \alpha_W(X) + U\gamma_W + \epsilon_W$ ,  
 $A = \alpha_A(X) + Z\zeta(X) + U\gamma_A(X) + \epsilon_A$ ,  $Z = \alpha_Z(X) + U\gamma_Z + \epsilon_U$ ,  
 $E[\epsilon_Y|Z, U, X] = 0$  and  $\text{rank}(\gamma_Z) \geq d_U$ .
  2. **Conditional instrument exogeneity:**  $E[\epsilon_W|Z, U, X] = 0$  and  $\text{rank}(\gamma_W) \geq d_U$ .
  3. **Instrument relevance (completeness):**  $\text{rank}(\zeta(x)) \geq d_A$  for any  $x \in \mathcal{X}$
  4. **Negative control outcomes:**  $E[\epsilon_Y|Z, U, X] = 0$  and  $\text{rank}(\gamma_Z) \geq d_U$ .
- Causal effect of interest:  $\beta(X)$  (ATE of A on Y with U conditioned out)

## Bridge Function Identification

Outcome bridge functions:  $H_0^{out} = \{h \in L_2(A, W) : E[k_0(A, U) - h(A, W)|A, U] = 0\} \neq \emptyset$   
 Observable bridge functions:  $H_0^{obs} = \{h \in L_2(A, W) : E[Y - h(A, W)|Z] = 0\} \neq \emptyset$

L4.0.2 Under A-LS, A-ICC, any  $h_0 \in H_0^{out}$  satisfies that  $E[Y - h_0(A, W)|Z] = 0$ .  
 L4.0.3 Under A-ICC,  $H_0^{out} = H_0^{obs}$ .

T4.1 Let  $\mathcal{T} : L_2(A, W) \rightarrow L_2(W) : (\mathcal{T}h)(w) = \int_{\mathcal{A}} h(a, w) \pi(a) d\mu_A(a)$  (linear operator).  
 With A4.1 and A3.1,  $\forall h_0 \in H_0^{obs}$ ,  $J = E[\widehat{\Phi}_{IV}(W; h_0)]$ , where  $\widehat{\Phi}_{IV}(w; h_0) = (\mathcal{T}h_0)(w)$ .


- Identification is also possible with first stage strict monotonicity and additional common confounding richness requirements (A5.1 and A5.2 in Tien [2022]) instead of A-LS

# Instrumented Common Confounding

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
## Test Relevance of Z and W for U

- Test  $H_0 : r_0 \leq r$  vs  $H_1 : r_0 > r$  (where  $r_0 = \text{rank}(\gamma_Z \gamma_W)$  [Chen & Fang, 2019]).
- Conclusion: Likely  $d_U = 1$ , max. 2.
- **A3** [ $\text{rank}(\gamma_Z) \geq d_U$ ] and **A4** hold.



## Test Relevance of Z for A (given U)

- Random forest for first stage with
  - $A - \hat{A}_X$  (outcome), X (covariates)
  - $\tilde{Z} - \hat{\tilde{Z}}_X$  and  $\tilde{U}_Z - \hat{\tilde{U}}_Z$  (LL regressor)
- **A3** holds:  $\text{rank}(\zeta(x)) \geq d_A$  for any  $x \in \mathcal{X}$ .
- $\tilde{U}_Z$  positively affect A



## Related Identification Approaches


Assumptions ...	Instrumental Variables	Negative Control	Mixture Models
stronger in ICC	+ <b>A3</b> : Z must be relevant for A <b>conditional on U</b> + <b>A4</b> : W must be available	+ <b>A3</b> : Z must be <b>relevant for A</b> conditional on U	+ Want to identify at most ATE, not entire model
weaker in ICC	- <b>A3</b> : Z can be exogenous <b>conditional on U</b>	- <b>A2</b> : A can be endogenous conditional on U (only Z must be cond. exogenous)	- <b>A2, A4</b> : Only need 2, not 3, independent variable sets conditional on U

## Theoretical Argument for Conditional Exogeneity of Z (given (U, X))

- Pre-college scores Z reflect ability U. Ability U affects socioeconomic and health outcomes W [Gottfredson, 2004].
- The effect is not through education A [Farrell & Fuchs, 1982]. So, ability U correlates Z and W.
- Pre-college scores Z don't affect net worth Y directly, Z only explain education A and correlate with ability U.
- Other background characteristics may matter [Link et al, 2008], so we include those in X.


## Results

### Random forest estimates



- IV and ICC estimates much larger than Baseline and Negative Control
- Ability U causes little positive bias
- ICC close to IV estimates and for nearly everyone significantly positive
- ✓ Confirm earlier IV results [Card, 2001] with different approach/instruments
- New evidence for important problem

### ICC RF Estimates with 90% CI



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